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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The minimum contacts theory enunciated in the leading
Supreme Court cases does not stand for the proposition that a
state may exercise in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant indiscriminately on the ground that defendant has had
contact with the state at some time or another. Rather, it is
contended that International Shoe stands for the proposition that
"solicitation plus" is enough only in so far as the obligation arises
out of that activity. The exercise of the privilege of conducting
activities within the state "may give rise to obligations, and, so
far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the
activities within the state," 27 the defendant may be held in personam
without any violation of due process. It is within this limited area
of activity that CPLR 302 has its effect.
The recent case of Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline2s is an
illustration of the fact that the "doing business" (presence) test
has not been altered in New York by the broadening of jurisdiction
under the "longarm" statute (CPLR 302). In that case, plaintiff,
a New York resident, was injured at an airport in Paris, France,
allegedly as the result of defendant's negligence. The defendant,
Finnair, was a corporation organized under the laws of Finland
and not registered in the United States. Service was made upon
the manager of Finnair's New York office. This office was staffed
by three full time and four part time employees, none of whom
was an officer of Finnair. All of defendant's flights originated
and terminated outside the United States. The New York
office sold no tickets, nor could it bind defendant by contract.
Finnair's New York office maintained a bank account which
averaged less than $2,000 and was used primarily to pay salaries
and rent. Aside from advertising and publicity work, it appeared
that the principal function of the New York office was to
receive from travel agencies reservations for travel on Finnair in
Europe. This information was transmitted thereafter to the
defendant in Europe. The court reaffirmed the "presence" test
holding that these activities were incidental and that they did not
constitute "doing business" in New York.29  The court stated
that CPLR 302 did not apply because the cause of action did not
originate from the business transacted in New York.
CPLR 302(a) (1): The "transaction of business."
CPLR 302(a)(1) requires a relationship between the trans-
action and the cause of action in order to be effective. Two recent
cases demonstrate the need for this relationship.
27 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 20, at 319; see
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
2822 App. Div. 2d 16, 253 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1st Dep't 1964).29 1d. at 22, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 221-22.
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In Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Corp.,30 the defendant operated
a resort and hotel in New Jersey. It maintained a telephone
listing in New York through which a party in New York could
be directly connected with the defendant in New Jersey. Plaintiff
utilized this telephone number to make reservations at the hotel,
and during her stay there, was injured through defendant's alleged
negligence. Special term denied defendant's motion to dismiss on
the ground that defendant's activities amounted to "transacting
business" and that such transaction resulted in a relationship be-
tveen the parties out of which the cause of action arose.3' The
appellate division reversed, holding that since the reservation,
regarded as a contract, was made in New Jersey, and since there
was no proof of physical activity by defendant's agents or employees
within New York, defendant did not have the "minimum contacts"
with New York required for in personam jurisdiction.32
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a similar
result in Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd.3 3  In that case,
New York plaintiffs purchased tickets for an extended tour through
a travel agency located within the state. Two tickets from Las
Vegas to Grand Canyon on defendant's bus line were among those
purchased. While on this journey, the bus crashed causing injury
to the plaintiffs. They sought damages for negligence and breach
of contract of safe carriage. Plaintiffs alleged jurisdiction under
CPLR 301 and 302. With respect to the "doing business" issue
(CPLR 301), the case was remanded to determine whether de-
fendant had an agent doing business in New York. If so, it
would be immaterial that the cause of action arose outside New
York at least for jurisdictional purposes. The court, however,
held CPLR 302 inapplicable. Assuming that the sale of tickets
by defendants through the travel agency was a "transaction of
business" within New York, plaintiffs' cause of action in tort
did not arise from that sale. The duty of care owed by defendant
did not arise until the plaintiffs boarded the bus in Las Vegas.3
In holding that the "transactions of business" did not give
rise to the injuries complained of, both the Greenberg and the
Gelfand cases would appear to be sound and in harmony with
3022 App. Div. 2d 690, 253 N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d Dep't 1964).
81 Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 182, 185, 250 N.Y.S.2d
40, 464 (Sup. Ct 1964).32 Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 690, 253 N.Y.S2d
344 (2d Dep't 1964).
33339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964).
34Id. at 321-22.
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other cases involving the single act statutes.35 To hold otherwise
might well violate due process.3 6
Assuming arguendo that the contract in the Greenberg case
was made in New York between plaintiff and defendant's agents,
it is submitted, nevertheless, that New York could not have
entertained jurisdiction under CPLR 302. At first impression,
the appellate division's decision in Singer v. Walker 3 7 might not
seem consistent with Greenberg, but Singer is easily distinguishable.
Although, in both cases the injury occurred outside the state, in
Singer there was an act done in New York (namely the circulation
of a dangerous instrumentality) which had a causal relation to the
injury. The fact that the plaintiff came into contact with the
instrumentality in New York was an essential nexus to sustain
jurisdiction. The court stated that if the plaintiff had not come
into contact with the instrumentality in New York, the cause of
action would not have arisen from any act done by defendant
in New York.38  In Greenberg, however, even if the contract had
been made in New York, there was no act performed which
would provide the nexus essential for the assumption of jurisdiction.
The making of the contract in New York would be merely in-
cidental to the tort which occurred in New Jersey.
It is not suggested that the cause of action arising out of the
transaction of business cannot be a tort or that the cause of action
must arise out of a wrongful act done by the defendant in New
York, but rather, that the cause of action must not be merely
incidental to the business transacted. It is one thing to say that
defendant and plaintiff made a contract in New York which was
breached by defendant in New Jersey, and quite another thing
to say that having made a contract in New York, defendant
negligently injured plaintiff in New Jersey. In the first case, the
cause of action is directly related to the transaction. In the
second case, it is incidental thereto.
s See generally Brunette Sunapee Corp. v. Zeolux Corp., 228 F. Supp.
805 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. Ill.
1959); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 21 App.
Div. 2d 474, 251 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't 1964); Perlmutter v. Standard
Roofing & Tinsmith Supply Co., 43 Misc. 2d 885, 252 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup.
Ct. 1964); Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73
(1959); Saletko v. Willys Motors, Inc., 36 Ill. App. 2d 7, 183 N.E.2d 569(1962).
36 See Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 27.
3 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964).
38 Id. at 289-91, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 221. See The Biannual Survey of New
York Practice, 39 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 178, 193 (1964), for a thorough dis-
cussion of the Singer case.
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